J.R. Lucas: References for Criticisms of the Gödelian Argument
This is a copy of a webpage by J.R. Lucas, undated. It has previously been available in the public domain as published by J. R. Lucas on his webpages before his demise. See the sitemap for other online articles by Lucas.
J.J.C.Smart, “Gödel’s Theorem, Church’s Theorem, and Mechanism”, Synthese, 13, 1961.,
J.J.C.Smart, “Man as a Physical Mechanism”, ch.VI of his Philosophy and Scientific Realism.
Hilary Putnam “Minds and Machines”, in Sidney Hook, ed., Dimensions of Mind. A Symposium, New York, 1960; reprinted in Kenneth M. Sayre and Frederick J. Crosson, eds., The Modeling of Mind, Notre Dame, 1963, pp. 255-271; and in A. R. Anderson, Minds and Machines, Prentice-Hall, 1964, pp. 43-59.
C.H. Whitely, “Minds, Machines and Gödel: a Reply to Mr. Lucas”, Philosophy, 37, 1962, pp.61-62.
Paul Benacerraf, “God, the Devil and Gödel”,The Monist, 1967, pp. 9-32.
I.J. Good, “Human and Machine Logic”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 18, 1967, pp. 144-147.
I.J.Good, “Gödel’s Theorem is a Red Herring”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 19, 1968, pp. 357-8.
David Lewis, “Lucas Against Mechanism”, Philosophy, XLIV, 1969, pp. 231-233.
David Coder, “Goedel’s Theorem and Mechanism”, Philosophy, XLIV, 1969, pp. 234-237, esp. p.236.
Jonathan Glover, Responsibility, London, 1970, p.31.
William Hanson, “Mechanism and Gödel’s Theorems”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, XXII, 1971.
D.C. Dennett, Review of The Freedom of the Will, Journal of Philosophy, 1972.
Charles S. Chihara, “On Alleged Refutations of Mechanism using Gödel’s Incompleteness Results”, Journal of Philosophy, LXIX, no.17, 1972.
Hao Wang, From Mathematics to Philosophy, London, 1974, pp.319, 320, 324-326.
A.J.P.Kenny in A.J.P.Kenny, H.C.Longuet-Higgins, J.R. Lucas and C.H.Waddington, The Nature of Mind, Edinburgh, 1976, p.75.
Anthony Hutton, “This Gödel is Killing Me”, Philosophia, vol. 6, no.1, 1976, pp. 135-144.
J.W. Thorp, “Free Will and Neurophysiological Determinism”, Oxford D.Phil. Thesis, 1976, p.79.
J.L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Penguin, 1977, p. 219.
David Lewis, “Lucas Against Mechanism II”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, IX, 1979, pp. 373-376.
Douglas R.Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach, New York, 1979, p.475.
Emmanuel Q. Fernando, “Mathematical and Philosophical Implications of the Gödel Incompleteness Theorems”. M.A. Thesis, College of Arts and Sciences, University of the Philippines, Quezu City, September 1980.
Judson C. Webb, Mechanism, Mentalism and Metamathematics; An Essay on Finitism, Dordrecht, 1980, p.230.
G. Lee Bowie, “Lucas’ Number is Finally Up”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11, 1982, pp.279-285.
P.Slezak, “Gödel’s Theorem and the Mind”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, XXXIII, 1982.
Rudy Rucker, “Gödel’s Theorem: The Paradox at the heart of modern man”, Popular Computing, February 1985, p.168.
David L. Boyer, “Lucas, Gödel and Astaire”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 1983, pp.147-159.
David Bostock, “Gödel and Determinism”, private communication, November, 1984.
Robert Kirk, “Mental Machinery and Gödel”,Synthese, 66, 1986, pp.437-452.
Added 24.2.97 In the recently published Proceedings, Machines and Thought, ed. Peter Millican and Andy Clark, Oxford, 1996, Robin Gandy gives a much earlier reference:
Emil L. Post, “Absolutely Unsolvable Problems and Relatively Undecidable Propositions - Account of an Anticipation”, in Martin Davis, (ed.), The Undecidable (New York: Raven Press, 1965), pp.340-435, esp. pp.417-24.
David Chalmers has many links. David Chalmers’ home page has now moved to http://consc.net/chalmers/ (I am grateful to David Pollard for keeping me up to date) Chalmer’s previous web site was http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/ (and before that http://ling.ucsc.edu/~chalmers/mind.html and before that http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~chalmers/biblio.html and http://ling.ucsc.edu/~chalmers/index.html)
Donald Gillies, Artificial Intelligence and Scientific Method, Chapter 6 Other works are cited in J.R. Lucas, The Freedom of the Will, Oxford, pp. 174-6.
The following additions have been sent to me:
- http://www.dla.utexas.edu/depts/philosophy/faculty/koons/ntse/papers/Baird.html
- http://www.sdsc.edu/~jeff/Godel_vs_AI.html#note5 His E-mail is:Jeff Makey (now https://www.sdsc.edu/~jeff/Godel_vs_AI.html)
- Penrose - Psyche: --http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-07-feferman.html or. more fully:
- Psyche Vol 2 Symposium on Roger Penrose’s Shadows of the Mind: http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/psyche-index-v2.html This also includes Penrose’s response, Beyond the Doubting of a Shadow (I am grateful to David Pollard for this extra link)
- Lucas’s fallacy modified: A Critique of Roger Penrose’s Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness In his two most recent … --http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~caywood/papers/penrose.txt
- Damjan Bojadziev, Gödel’s theorem for minds and computers
- Selmer Bringsjord, A refutation of Penrose’s new Gödelian case against the computational conception of mind
- Matt Caywood, Lucas’s fallacy modified: A critique of Penrose’s Shadows of the Mind
- David Chalmers, Minds, machines, and mathematics
- Kari Coleman, Gödel propositions for the mind
- Daniel Dennett, Review of The Emperor’s New Mind
- Harry Deutsch, Deconstructing mathematics and mind: Some implications of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems
- Solomon Feferman, Penrose’s Gödelian argument
- Rick Grush & Patricia Churchland, Gaps in Penrose’s toilings
- Tim Maudlin, Between the motion and the act.
- Daryl McCullough, Can humans escape Gödel?
- Drew McDermott, [STAR] Penrose is wrong
- Roger Penrose, Beyond the doubting of a shadow
- Hilary Putnam, Review of Shadows of the Mind
- Brian Rosmaita, Minds, machines, and metamathematics
- Aaron Sloman, The emperor’s real mind
- Bhupinder Singh Anand, Some Consequences …, The paper is accessible in HTML format at: http://alixcomsi.com/CTG_06_Consequences.htm.
- http://dscreat.com/godel.html by Daniel Sadolevsky, E-mail [email protected]
- Ricardo Pereira Tassinari and Itala M.D.L. D’Ottaviano PDF Cogito ergo sum non machine is the most recent discussion I am aware of.
The Turing Test
- Stephen Cowley & Karl MacDorman, Simulating conversations: The communion game
- Robert French, Refocusing the debate on the Turing Test: A reply to Jacquette
- Stevan Harnad, The Turing test is not a trick
- Stevan Harnad, Other bodies, other minds (and Larry Hauser’s reply)
- Jason Hutchens, How to pass the Turing test by cheating
- Michael Mauldin, Chatterbots, tinymuds, and the Turing test: Entering the Loeber Prize
- Peter Seibel, Turing Test, etc. http://www,javamonkey.com/resume/turing.html
- Stuart Shieber, Lessons from a restricted Turing test (and Hugh Loebner’s reply)
- Thomas Whalen, My experience at Loebner Prize
- Shapiro, Stewart. PDF Incompleteness, Mechanism, and Optimism The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4 (Sept 1998): 273-302.
- Roger Penrose, Beyond the doubting of a shadow, ???
- Hilary Putnam, ???,
- Robert E. Horn, Can Computers Think?, New Scientist, 10 July 1999. www.newscinetist.com. I have not been over these.
- A full discussion of the issues raised is now available
- “Consistency, mechanicalness, and the logic of the mind - group of 2” » Q Yu - Synthese, 1992 - Springer
- “Both the anti-mechanist and I agree that the recursiveness and the consistency of proof ” 158 QIUEN YU … S 1 is said to be QG-representable (Q for quasi) in $2 if … (Cited by 3 - Related Articles - Web Search)
- “Yu and your mind”, G. Priest - Synthese, 1993 - Springer
- … ed.), Creativity, Kluwer, Dordrecht. Yu, Q: 1992.
- “Consistency, Mechanicalness, and the Logic of the Mind”, Synthese 90, 145-79 …. (Cited by 1 - Related Articles - Web Search)
- “Further explanations of the Gödel scenario of the mind: A reply to Prof. Graham Priest”, Q Yu - Synthese, 1993 - Springer
- “… Page 5. THE GODEL SCENARIO OF THE MIND”, 465 Yu, Qiuen: 1992
- “Consistency, Mechanicalness, and the Logic of the Mind”, Synthese 90, 145-79.
Rationale: Every logical argument must be defined in some language, and every language has limitations. Attempting to construct a logical argument while ignoring how the limitations of language might affect that argument is a bizarre approach. The correct acknowledgment of the interactions of logic and language explains almost all of the paradoxes, and resolves almost all of the contradictions, conundrums, and contentious issues in modern philosophy and mathematics.
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