Logic and Language

Logic and Language

Copyright © James R Meyer 2012 - 2017 www.jamesrmeyer.com

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3: The axioms and rules of the formal system

Note that (provided you have JavaScript enabled) clicking on (show) will reveal further details, while clicking again will hide it. Also, clicking on (show Gödel’s) will reveal relevant parts of Gödel’s text (shown in green), while clicking again will hide it. Please note that older browsers may not display some symbols correctly.

If there is any difficulty in following any part of the proof, please contact me and I will try to help. And if you have any suggestions as to how this guide might be improved, please contact me. This guide is intended to be read alongside the English translation of Gödel’s original proof which can be viewed online at English translation of Gödel’s original proof or as a PDF file at English translation of Gödel’s original proof, PDF file.

As is the case for the formal system **P** in general, the precise details of the axioms of this system are not important. It might be wondered whether the system **P** has sufficient axioms and rules of inference - that perhaps some detail has been omitted which renders the system not powerful enough to be complete. But this would be to miss the point - which is that Gödel’s proof can *in principle* be applied to any formal system (provided it contains a certain amount of basic arithmetic, such as defining natural numbers and basic operations on those numbers). So that even if there was some deficiency in the system **P, **the overall thrust of the argument would remain and be applicable to all formal systems which include a basic arithmetical core. That said, you still need to be familiar with the terminology that Gödel uses if you are to follow the principle of Gödel’s argument.

Note that, while in most logical systems in common use today, every variable in an axiom is bound by a quantifier, in Gödel’s system P, this is not the case - the axioms can have variables which are not bound by a quantifier. However, every such axiom can be converted to a formula in which all the variables are bound, as will be seen below.

There are two rules of inference (show Gödel’s) .

- If the formula
**(~(b)) ∨ (c)**is an axiom or is a proven formula, and**b**is an axiom or is proved, then the formula**c**is proved. - If the formula
**a**is an axiom or is a proven formula, then the formula**v∀(a)**is proved, where**v**is any variable.

Hence, given an axiom or proven formula whose variables are not bound by a quantifier, by repeated application of rule 2 we can obtain the same formula where each variable is bound by a quantifier.

Gödel divides the axioms into five sections.

Note that the axioms **II**, **III**, and **V** are actually Axiom Schemas; this means that each ‘axiom’ actually represents infinitely many axioms, which are given by replacing the appropriate variables in the schemas by specific values. For example, for the Axiom Schema II.1 below (**p ∨ p ⊃ p**), we could replace** p** by any formula of the formal system to give a single axiom.

Note: the axioms as given include some symbols which are not actually symbols of the formal system **P**. The reason for this is as follows:

The system **P** uses a very small set of symbols. There are several symbols in common usage which are effectively abbreviations for long combinations of the basic symbols of the system **P**. Gödel uses these symbols because the actual representation in the notation of the system **P** would be very lengthy and difficult to read. The symbols Gödel uses are listed is below, along with the equivalent representation by symbols of the formal system **P**:

⊃ ‘implies’ |
a ⊃ b is equivalent to (~a) ∨ b |

∃ ‘there exists’ |
(∃u)b is equivalent to ~(u∀(~b)) |

≡ ‘equivalence’ |
a ≡ b is equivalent to (a ⊃ b) ∧ (b ⊃ a) |

= ‘equals’ | x is defined as _{1} = y_{1}x (Footnote: For all type 2 classes _{2}∀ (x_{2}(x_{1}) ⊃ x_{2}(y_{1}))x, if _{2}x is a member of that class, then _{1}y is a member of that class. Since this applies to _{1}all type 2 classes, then if both x and _{1}y are a member of a class that has only one member, then it must be the case that _{1}x is identical to _{1}y. Similarly for higher type classes.)
_{1} |

∧ ‘and’ | c ∧ d is equivalent to ~((~c) ∨ (~d)) |

Note that Gödel also uses the symbol **.** in the axiom I.3; this is equivalent to the **∧** symbol.

Note that, for convenience Gödel follows convention in omitting some brackets that would be present in the actual corresponding formula of the formal system. For example, in the following, wherever the **⊃** symbol (the ‘implies’ symbol) occurs, all of the expression to the left of the symbol implies all of the expression to the right of the symbol, unless that part of the expression containing the **⊃** symbol is enclosed by brackets.

These are elementary axioms about natural numbers.

1. **~( fx_{1} = 0)**

No successor of a number can be equal to zero.

2. *f*x_{1} = *f*y_{1} ⊃ x_{1} = y_{1}

Given two numbers, if we add one to each number, and the resultant numbers are equal, then
that implies (the **⊃ **symbol) that the original numbers are both equal.

3. **x _{2}(0)** ∧

This is what is usually called an axiom of induction. Given any class of natural numbers, if **0** is a member of that class, and if, for every natural number **x _{1}**, if

These are Axiom Schemas, based on axioms of classical propositional logic. In the Schemas below **p**, **q** and **r** can be any formula of the formal system.

1. **p ∨ p ⊃ p**

For any formula **p**, **p** or **p** implies **p**.

2. **p ⊃ p ∨ q**

For any formula **p**, **p** implies ‘**p** or any other formula **q**’.

3. **p ∨ q ⊃ q ∨ p**

For any formulas **p** and **q**, ‘**p **or **q**’ implies ‘**q** or **p**’.

4. **(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (r ∨ p ⊃ r ∨ q)**

For any formulas **p**, **q** and **r**, ‘**p** implies **q**’ implies that ‘(**r** or **p**) implies (**r** or **q**)’

In these Axiom Schemas,

**a** is any formula,

**v** is any variable,

**b** is a formula and

**c** is a sign;

**b** and **c** are subject to certain conditions (show Gödel’s).

1. **v∀(a) ⊃ Subst a(v|c)**

This states that, if for all **v**, formula **a** applies, then every formula given by the substitution of a valid value **c** for **v** applies.

As Gödel notes, the **Subst** function is a function of the meta-language, not of the formal system **P**. So while there is no expression of the formal system that corresponds to the above expression when values are simply inserted for **a**, **b**, **c**, and **v**, there are formulas that correspond to the expressions given when appropriate values are inserted for **a**, **b**, **c**, and **v** and the * value* given by the meta-language function

Note that normally we use the term substitution to refer to the substitution of a variable by a specific value which is a member of the domain of the variable. Here **Subst** allows variables to be substituted by variables, provided they are of the same type, subject to certain conditions; this is akin to changing the names of the variables in a formula.

2. **v∀(b ∨ a) ⊃ b ∨ v∀(a)**

This states that, ‘if for all **v**, **b** or **a**’ applies, then ** ‘b** or for all **v**, **a’** applies (provided that **v** is not a free variable in **b**) .

In this Axiom Schema,

**v** and **u** are variables, where **u** is one **type** higher than **v**, and

**a** is formula which does not have **u** as free variable

1. **(∃u)(v∀(u(v)≡a))**

For every formula, there is a corresponding class whose members satisfy that formula.

In this axiom we have type 1 and type 2 variables.

1. **x _{1}∀(x_{2}(x_{1}) ≡ y_{2}(x_{1})) ⊃ x_{2} = y_{2}**

If two classes have precisely the same members, then they are identical.

Further axioms are defined by this axiom by applying Type-lift to the basic formula above.

Footnotes:

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It has come to my notice that, when asked about the demonstration of the flaw in his proof (see A Fundamental Flaw in an Incompleteness Proof by Peter Smith PDF), Smith refuses to engage in any logical discussion, and instead attempts to deflect attention away from any such discussion. If any other reader has tried to engage with Smith regarding my demonstration of the flaw, I would be interested to know what the outcome was.

There is a new addition to the page Yet another flawed incompleteness proof, where Berto’s proof of incompleteness in his book *There’s something about Gödel* comes under scrutiny.

I found that making, adding or deleting footnotes in the traditional manner proved to be a major pain. So I developed a different system for footnotes which makes inserting or changing footnotes a doddle. You can check it out at Easy Footnotes for Web Pages (Accessibility friendly).

I have now added a new section to my paper on Russell O’Connor’s claim of a computer verified incompleteness proof. This shows that the flaw in the proof arises from a reliance on definitions that include unacceptable assumptions - assumptions that are not actually checked by the computer code. See also the new page Representability.

There is now a new page on Chaitin’s Constant (Chaitin’s Omega), which demonstrates that Chaitin has failed to prove that it is actually algorithmically irreducible.

13 May 2015 Good Math, Bad Math?

16th Mar 2015 Bishops Dancing with Pixies?

23rd Feb 2015 Artificial Intelligence

31 Mar 2015 Cranks and Crackpots

For convenience, there are now two pages on this site with links to various material relating to Gödel and the Incompleteness Theorem

– a page with general links:

– and a page relating specifically to the Gödel mind-machine debate:

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Copyright © James R Meyer 2012 - 2017

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