# J. R. Lucas: Talk on The Implications of Gödel’s Theorem - Handout

This is a copy of a web-page by J.R. Lucas, from Feb 1998. It has previously been available in the public domain as published by J. R. Lucas on his web-pages before his demise.

Handout for talk given to the Sigma Club on February 26th, 1998 on The Implications of Gödel’s Theorem

Gödel’s First Theorem, that a certain well-formed formula, which is the code for:

**wff. no. m … (∀n)(n is not the gödel number of m)**

is neither provable not disprovable in first-order Peano Arithmetic (granted that it is consistent) has the following consequences:

1. Some purely arithmetical questions are undecidable - some research programmes may be hopeless. [J.Paris and L.Harrington, “A Mathematical Incompleteness in Peano Arithmetic”, in J.Barwise, ed., *Handbook of Mathematical Logic*, Amsterdam, 1977.] So may-be we always shall be ignorant of the answers to some mathematical questions; no doctrine of Assurance.

2. Gödel’s Second Theorem: The Consistency of a reasonably rich system cannot be proved within that system - End of Hilbert’s Programme.

3. Church’s Theorem

4. Non-standard models of Peano Arithmetic (can be proved without recourse to Gödel’s Theorem)--inadequacy of formal specification; suggests some form of realism.

5. Quine wrong in thinking first-order logic is cat’s whiskers. See under III for difference between Peano’s fifth postulate in first- and in second-order logic: Either we have only first-order logic, in which case we need some platonic access to the natural numbers in order to distinguish them from non-standard models of Peano Arithmetic: or we have second-order logic, which involves quantifcation over qualities and relations, which must then, Quinely, be supposed to exist.

6. Verificationism and Intuitionism are wrong.

7. Knowledge claims fallible

8. Realism

9. Quine still wrong in thinking first-order logic is cat’s whiskers. Completeness of first-order logic shows poverty of aspiration rather than fulness of achievement. Implausible to maintain that truths of second-order logic are all analytic. But they are *a priori*.

10. If synthetic *a priori* propositions are possible, Empiricism wrong. Rationalism respectable.

11. To be reasonable is not merely to follow a rule. Reason can be creative and original.

12. Not out of the question to rely on other people being reasonable.

**I: Truth outruns provability**

Once the concept of proof has been made explicit, and the criteria for being provable clearly laid down, Gödel’s theorem shows that there are truths which go beyond that concept of provable. “there are some mathematical disciplines that can never be completely formalized” (J.Myhill, “Some Implications of Mathematical Logic”, *The Review of Metaphysics*, VI, no.2, 1952, [pp.165-199, esp. pp.181-192,] p.182]. To be reasonable is not just to be in accordance with a rule. Aristotle sometimes talks of *kata ton orthosn logon*, according to the right rule, sometimes of *meta logou*, with reason; Gödel’s theorem suggests that there is a real difference, and that however carefully we specify rules or criteria, reason is not just rule-observance and can go beyond mere conformity to rules. Rules will still be important, but not all important. Originality and creativity In history or literary criticism it may be right to recognise the authority of great historians or sensitive critics without being able to reduce their reasoning to explicit syllogistic form. In politics, although we may well distrust the judgement of men, we cannot have our government altogether a “Government of laws, not men”.

**II: Non-standard Models of Peano Arithmetic**

It is difficult to see how there could be a model of Peano’s postulates other than the standard one, which we pictured as the boy’s railway track starting with some buffers and extending indefinitely far in one direction. This indeed is how the non-standard model starts too. The non-standardness only crops up over the horizon, so to speak, that is, among the transfinite numbers. The non-standard model of Peano Arithmetic starts off with a progression of order-type w, but then has indefinitely many additional chunks, each of order-type ω* + ω, the order-type of the integers, negative as well as positive. The order-type ω* + ω looks like this: … -7, -6, -5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, … it is what we use for dating, where 1 BC is followed immediately by 1 AD.

The chunks of order-type ω* + ω in the non-standard model themselves have the order-type eta, the dense order-type exemplified by the rational numbers. There is a concertina effect. Wherever we look, we find a stretch of track of order-type ω* + ω, but between any two such stretches, unless they are part of the same chunk, and separated by only a finite number of pieces of rail, there are further chunks, each of order-type ω* + ω. That is to say, although locally we are dealing with a discrete ordering, where each bit of track has a next bit of track and a previous bit of track, globally the separate chunks, each of order-type ω* + ω, are not discrete; there is no next chunk after any particular one. |+++…++++…++++…++++…++++… ω*+ω ω*+ω ω*+ω ω*+ω For fuller details, see G.S.Boolos and R.C.Jeffrey, *Computability and Logic*, Cambridge, 1974, 1980, 1989, Section 17, pp.193-195.

**III: Second-Order Logic**

Peano’s fifth postulate in first-order logic:

*F*(0) & [*F*(*m*) ⇒ *F*(*m′*)] ⇒ (∀*n*)*F*(*n*)

with the *F* as a free variable, not bound by any quantifier. If you name any particular *F* you please, then provided that it is hereditary and holds of *0*, it holds of all the natural numbers; but that is a less stringent condition than the second-order one, where it holds of *every F*, whether you name it or not. Indeed, there can be only a denumerable infinity, aleph_{0}, of *F*s you might possibly name, whereas there may well be a non-denumerable infinity aleph_{1} of properties over which the quantifier (**∀ F**) ranges in Peano’s fifth postulate in second-order logic:

**(∀ F ){F(0) & [F(m) ⇒ F(m′)] ⇒ (∀n)F(n)}**

First-order logic is **complete** and compact. For every well-formed formula, G, of first-order logic,

**|- G if and only if |= G**

but only because many well-formed formulae of second-order logic are not accounted well-formed in first-order logic.

Second-order logic is ontologically lush, not recursively axiomatizable, not analytic, but arguably adequate: first-order logic is economical with entities, can be done by computers, arguably analytic, but inadequate - even for characterizing the natural numbers.

Note: Self-reference only possible because there are a Dedekind infinity of natural numbers. Otherwise Gödel’s coding impossible.

Rationale: Every logical argument must be defined in some language, and every language has limitations. Attempting to construct a logical argument while ignoring how the limitations of language might affect that argument is a bizarre approach. The correct acknowledgment of the interactions of logic and language explains almost all of the paradoxes, and resolves almost all of the contradictions, conundrums, and contentious issues in modern philosophy and mathematics.Site MissionPlease see the menu for numerous articles of interest. Please leave a comment or send an email if you are interested in the material on this site.

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